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STATE OF UTAH 
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vs. 
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IN SUPPORT OF DENIAL OF REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Action by a grain dealer against a producer, 
farmer, for damages for breach of alleged verbal 
contract. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE 
The lower court submitted special interrogatories 
to the jury and granted judgment to the plaintiff for 
$13,150.00 damages against the defendant. On appeal 
this court reversed the lov/er court holding under the 
circumstances of the case that the defendant farmer was 
' -2-
not a "merchant" under the Utah Uniform Commercial 
Code and further that the confirmation of a purported 
verbal contract was not received within a reasonable 
time under the code and the facts of the case. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
Defendant seeks the denial of the petition for 
rehearing. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant for 25 years, either alone or with his 
Father, has been a hay and grain farmer. He has never 
sold these commodities for anyone other than himself nor 
has he sold any such commodities that were not produced 
on his farm. He does not offer the goods for sale to 
the public. Plaintiff is regularly engaged in the buy-
ing and selling of grain, either as a broker or for his 
own account. 
On August 2, 19 73, the plaintiff telephoned the 
defendant and talked about the purchase of the latter1s 
wheat crop soon to be harvested at Sublet, Idaho. The 
price discussed was $3.30 per bushel and the anticipated 
harvest was about 15,000 bushels. According to the 
defendant, plaintiff would see if he could get that price. 
No further contact or communication between the parties 
occurred until August 15th. 
-3- . : 
According to the plaintiff, on August 3, 1973, 
the plaintiff entered in his notebook written notation 
of the purchase 'red wheat, rye mix.,. 15f000 bushels, 
$3.30 per bushel, as is.' Such notation or confirmation 
was mailed by the plaintiff to the defendant on or about 
the 14th day of August 1973 and was received by the 
defendant in the mails in the afternoon of August 15, 
197 3. The notation of this transaction dated August 3, 
was out of sequence with other transactions in plaintiff's 
notebook and had it been in its proper sequence would 
have been dated August 13th or 14th. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT A 
"MERCHANT" IN THIS CASE NOR WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE. 
There is no evidence in the record whatever that 
defendant was anything other than a farmer. Defendant 
never sold or bought wheat for anyone other than him-
self and other than the sale of his own wheat he never 
dealt in grain nor by his occupation or otherwise held 
himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to 
the grain trade nor has he employed an agent or broker 
or intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out 
as having such knowledge or skill. Plaintiff argues 
in his brief that regardless of the interpretation 
given by the general public to the term "merchant" 
or by its interpretation by the judiciary the word 
"merchant" should have a different ?specific1 meaning 
when used in the Uniform Commercial Code. It is to 
be noted however, Section 70A-2-104 uses language of 
common understanding in defining "merchant", to~wit, 
-
 fa person who deals in goods of the kind' or Other-
wise by his occupation holds himself out as having 
knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods 
involved in the transaction1, or - 'by his employment 
of an agent or broker who - by his occupation holds 
himself out as having such knowledge or skill.1 It 
does not seem logical that a person who^ once a year or 
perhaps once in two years in the case of dry farmers, 
sells the crops he has raised thereby becomes a "person 
who deals in goods of the kind" or that he thereby "holds 
himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to 
the practices or goods involved". As pointed out by this 
court, adoption of plaintiff's argument would make a 
"merchant" of practically anyone who sold anything. 
Further, if plaintiff's argument applied to sellers, 
it would seem that it should also apply to buyers and 
the "lawyer or banker" who made annual purchases of 
fishing tackle or golf balls would likewise become a 
-5- . -. / 
"merchant" regardless of the circumstances in each case. 
Both the Plaintiff's and Amicus Curiae Briefs miss 
the point of this court's ruling that in the instant case 
'the trial court should have ruled as a matter of law 
under the circumstances shown here the defendant was not 
a "merchant" within the meaning of the Statute.' 
Despite the Amicus Curiae protest of concern for 
Grain Dealers being imposed upon by farmers, they are 
protesting in a case where as a matter of fact the Grain 
Dealer had, for 12 days while the market rose wildly sat 
on his notice of confirmation and then, after the great 
rise in price mailed it to the farmer, disregarded the 
acknowledged verbal rejection thereof and after the 10 
day lapse of time filed his suit claiming damages in excess 
of $23,000.00. The condonation of such treatment of farmers 
can hardly be in the best interest of AmiCXB Curiae, Grain 
Dealers, or the Public. For the same conclusion see Cook 
Grains Inc. v. Paul Fallis 395 SW2, 555, 239 Ark. 962. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT AN UNEXPLAINED LAPSE OF 
12 or 13 DAYS IN RECEIVING A WRITTEN CONFIRMATION OF A 
PURPORTED CONTRACT WAS NOT A REASONABLE TIME IN THIS CASE 
NOR WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
The plaintiff's failure to mail the claimed confirmation 
of contract for 12 full days after preparing the same as 
he claimed, or the preparation of the alleged confirmation 
-6-
on the 14th day of August, as it would appear from the 
location of the confirmation in plaintiff's records, 
during which time with plaintiff's full knowledge the 
grain market was fluctuating rapidly upward, would seem 
to admit to reasonable minds, no other conclusion than 
that plaintiff was awaiting a certain favorable position 
to himself before forwarding anything that would bind him 
to a contract. To argue that after the sharp rise in price 
over a 12 or 13 day period, during which time plaintiff 
had made out no less than 6 other notations or confirma-
tions in the same book at increased prices was within a 
reasonable time) strains credulity and would be much like 
the 'gate keeper' arguing he timely closed the gate after-
watching all the horses run free. Reference is hereby 
made to the Lund vs. St. Paul M&M Railraod Company 71 P. 
1032, 31 Wash. 286, Alsam Holding Co. v. Consolidated Tax 
Payers Mutual Ins. Co. N.Y.S. 2d 498, State vs. Commissioners 
of Cascade County 296 P 1, 89 Montana 37, Citizens Bank 
Bldg. v. Ellen E. Werthheimer 180 SW 361, 126 Arkansan 38,. 
Hill v. Hobart 16 Main 164, Colefax County vs. Butler 
County 120 NW 444 83 Nebraska 803, relating to "reasonable 
time" and holding the same to be a question of law. 
CONCLUSION 
The court properly ruled under the circumstances 
of this case that the defendant and appellant was not 
by reason of merely having grown and marketed his own 
_7-
wheat for a period of 25 years a "merchant", as a 
matter of law. Further the willful or negligent delay 
for 12 days on a rapidly fluctuating market, to mail 
notice of confirmation of an alleged verbal contract, 
under these and the other circumstances of this case 
was not done 'within a reasonable time'. The petition 
for rehearing should be denied. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
Omer J. Call 
Attorney at Law 
26 First Security Bank Bldg. 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Attorney for Defendant 
and Appellant 
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